The paper begins with the underlying theoretical model, which is followed by a section which deals with the empirical analysis. The final section summarises and concludes.
The theoretical model
In this section we extend the wage model put forward in Arestis and Scott (1993) and Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1995) , itself based on efficiency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles and Boyer, 1990) . The fundamental idea is that conflict in the work place arises over labour productivity (e) and the real wage (W/P). This is summarized in (1): where the sign under a variable gives the direction of the partial derivative. Labour productivity depends on the cost of job loss (c) and socio-economic factors z 1 (Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1995) , so that:
with the cost of job loss conventionally determined by the real wage (W/P), the expected real wage (W e /P e ), the chance of unemployment (U), and the expected income from unemployment (W e u /P e ), which allows us to re-write (2)' as:
where z includes z 1 and the remaining elements in c.
Efficiency wage theories are concerned with the relationship between work effort and the real wage. In fact, wages are negotiated in a decentralized bargaining process which determines the nominal wage on the basis of workers' expected real wage (W e /P e ). Combining equations (1) and (2), we may establish a direct relationship between the negotiated nominal wage (W t+1 ), the expected real wage and the socio-economic factors (z) as:
We next discuss briefly the socio-economic elements which refer to the conflict over income distribution and worker militancy (Rowthorn, 1977; , pay norms and fairness of pay between groups of workers (Keynes, 1936; Hicks, 1975) , and the level and composition of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1987; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Nickell, 1987) . Conflict in the labour market is measured by the aspiration gap (Π * -Π n ) which shows the extent to which the target profit share (Π * ) differs from the negotiated profit share (Π n ). The latter depends on the claims of the foreign (F) and government (G) sectors and demand conditions in the labour market proxied by unemployment (U). The target profit share is determined by the claims of the government and foreign sectors and demand conditions in the product market (Φ). A positive aspiration gap implies that workers' actual wage is below the one they anticipated in wage negotiations. In response they may threaten to withdraw or reduce work effort as a means to enforce wage claims. Workers are the more successful in demanding higher wages, the lower the rate of unemployment is and the more militant (X) they are.
Fairness of pay between groups of workers relates to the wage structure, where workers resist money wage cuts for fear of a decline in their relative position in the wage hierarchy (Keynes, 1936) . A wage system with well established wage differentials is regarded as fair and it becomes what is expected to be (Hicks, 1975) . The real expected wage (W e /P e ) is thought to capture this historical element that affects the effort function and the negotiated wage.
Hysteresis theories are concerned with the composition of unemployment and the effect different groups in the pool of unemployed have on real wage determination. The long-term unemployed (LU) effectively drop out of the labour market, so that they do not exert downward pressures on wage claims themselves, but allow insiders to have a major impact. The rising inflow into short-term unemployment (∆U) threatens insiders' jobs and they may give in on wage objectives.
We may now summarize the socio-economic elements and thus write the z-vector as:
Substituting (4) into (3), we may arrive at:
Writing the model in log-linear form, equation (6) follows:
where lower case letters denote logarithms and where all coefficients are greater than zero. The function h(u) comprises unemployment and hysteresis effects. The vector ti stands for the claims of the foreign and government sectors on private output and contains real import costs and tax variables. The expressions in square brackets describe the aspiration gap as discussed above, without the tax and import cost variables since they are already included in the ti variable. The first square bracket describes the target profit share as a mark-up over real wage costs in relation to the demand conditions in the product market, proxied by capacity utilization. At this stage, we incorporate one of the hypotheses we are particularly interested in, namely the effect of capital on wages and employment (Malinvaud, 1986; Sneessens and Dreze, 1986; Bean, 1989; Rowthorn, 1995; van de Klundert and van Schaik, 1990) . The fundamental idea of the capital shortage hypothesis is that big adverse shocks, as for example the two oil price shocks, may persistently increase unemployment due to a fall in investment. The oil price shocks increased the claims of the foreign sector on national income and caused accelerated inflation. In order to bring inflation under control, restrictive demand policies were introduced. As a result, capacity utilization fell and firms scrapped spare capital. 1 After the shocks were reversed, inflationary pressures were reduced and employment rose. However, employment did not return to previous levels due to a lack of productive capital. As a consequence, the economy is locked into a situation of high unemployment combined with normal capacity utilization.
2 It follows from this discussion that capacity utilization is explained by capital stock and the level of economic activity as this is proxied by the unemployment rate (Rowthorn, 1995) . Substituting capital stock and unemployment for Φ in equation (6) and assuming that expectations are formed as in Layard et al. (1991) , i.e. as:
and performing some simple algebraic transformations, we arrive at equation (8): The relationship in equation (8) can be interpreted as follows: nominal wage acceleration depends on real wages, productivity, unemployment, real benefits, tax and import costs, capital stock, the expected changes in these variables and a variable capturing militancy. Most of the variables included are standard (Arestis and Skott, 1993; Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1994; Wren-Lewis, 1992; Hall and Henry, 1987; Layard et al., 1991) , except for the capital stock. An increase in the capital stock allows real wages to rise, as capacity utilization falls and firms' ability to mark-up is limited (Rowthorn, 1995) .
The long-run real wage equation can be obtained by letting ∆(w-p), ∆(w u -p), ∆lp, ∆ti, ∆u and ∆k equal to zero to give:
where lu denotes the ratio of the long-term unemployed in the pool of the unemployed. As suggested by membership theories, the long-term unemployed are not able to price themselves into the labour market because of a decline in human capital, low motivation for active job 1 In fact, the growth rate of gross capital was on average -0. 4% between 1974 and 1981. 2 Note that high levels of unemployment and 'normal' levels of capacity utilization indicate a limited substitutability between capital and labour during this period. Consequently, the argument that the slowdown in capital accumulation (from an average of 3.5% in the pre shock period to 1.4% since 1974) may have no adverse implications for employment provided the reduction in capital accumulation is associated with the adoption of more labour intensive techniques than would otherwise have been, is not valid here.
search, and a stigmatizing perception of the potential employer.
When the target and the negotiated profit shares are equal, where the latter is derived as a residual in the bargaining process, unanticipated inflation is zero and the 'equilibrium' unemployment rate can be derived (Rowthorn, 1977) . Assuming that firms mark-up prices over labour costs, an aspiration gap of zero implies that the real wage (per unit of output) acceptable to firms is equal to the bargained wage. Furthermore, assuming productivity neutrality with respect to unemployment (Blanchard, 1988) , an assumption that is widely backed by empirical results (Manning, 1992; Elmeskov, 1993; National Institute Model 12, 1995; Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1994) , and equating firms' target (feasible) real wage share with the bargained real wage share, we may derive the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) as follows:
The NAIRU is an increasing function of real benefits, tax-and import costs, and worker militancy, and declines with the increase in the capital stock. A positive relationship between real wages and unemployment benefit implies that a fall in the latter results in a decline in unemployment, due to its labour-cost-reducing impact. However, a cut in wage compensation may have other effects that outweigh the favourable cost effects. In response to a fall in real benefits, the unemployed may reduce searching time, and they may have to accept jobs for which they are less suitably qualified than they would accept if the cost of search was lower. The consequent inefficiencies in the labour market may have an adverse effect on the unemployment rate and it may be an empirical question as to which of the effects is more important. We return to this issue in section 3. An increase in taxes or import costs will, under given demand conditions, increase conflict over income shares and will raise inflationary pressure. The more wage earners resist a fall in their income share, the lower are the tax-and import-effects on the long-run unemployment rate. Worker militancy affects the bargained real wage and ceteris paribus income distribution, where the latter determines the level of employment through its supply and demand side effects.
Empirical investigation 3
The first part of the empirical section deals with the determination of the cointegrating relationships corresponding to equations (9) and (10). The effect of capital shortage on the longterm unemployed is tested in the sub-section that follows, with the third sub-section concerned with the error correction models dictated by the analysis and empirical results in the rest of this section.
Cointegrating Vectors for Real Wages and Unemployment
We estimate a vector autoregressive regression (VAR) model for the determination of real wages and unemployment as described by equations (9) and (10), applying Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood test and estimation procedures. 4 The Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (Lütkepohl, 1991) suggest that the optimal lag length for the VAR is two. The likelihood ratio test of the deletion of the deterministic trend and a dummy for the first quarter of 1975, where real wages were exceptionally high, rejects the null hypothesis with a chi-square statistic (CHSQ) of 36.7 for 12 degrees of freedom. Based on the variable set in equation (9), the results of the maximal eigenvalue test, the trace test, the Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz-Bayesian criteria suggest two cointegrating vectors. We proceeded with the identification of the two cointegrating vectors, applying the Pesaran and Shin (1994) approach which relies on imposing non-homogeneous restrictions on the two cointegrating vectors. 5 The result is the following two cointegrating relationships:
where all variables are in logarithms. The likelihood ratio test of the validity for the overidentifying restriction is CHSQ(6) = 10.17 with a significance level of 0.12, denoting the validity of the restricted system. The first equation describes the average real wage (w-p), determined by labour productivity (lp), unemployment (u), strike activity (x), gross capital stock (k) and long-term unemployment (lu), defined as the ratio of those who are unemployed for more than 52 weeks to the total number of unemployed. The second equation explains unemployment as a function of strike activity, capital stock, and long-term unemployment.
We find proportionality between labour productivity and real wages, suggesting that gains in labour productivity are completely absorbed by increases in real wages, without affecting unemployment. The effect of militancy on wages (11a) and unemployment (11b) is uncontroversial. As we know, particularly from the 1970s, organized labour in the UK reacted to supply side shocks with increased strike activity, thereby causing a decline in output and wage gains above labour productivity growth. Investment in productive capacity affects both real wages and unemployment. At a given level of economic activity, a higher capital stock implies higher capacity utilization, thereby reducing firms' ability to increase prices and allowing real wages to rise. Furthermore, investment in new capacity increases employment. The long-term unemployed do not exert downward pressure on real wages and their effect on the NAIRU is considerable.
Interestingly enough, the tax and import wedge do not affect the cointegrating vectors. The lack of empirical evidence of tax and import effects is due to them being more likely shortrun effects. For example, an increase in import cost in relation to the domestic price level improves competitiveness and raises wage pressure by making consumption goods more expensive relative to value added output. If a rise in competitiveness enables firms to mark-up they are not reported here, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
prices to compensate for the higher cost in the long-run, this would imply that they could increase their domestic profit share indefinitely (Layard et al., 1991) . Equally, a permanent effect of competitiveness on wage setting implies that workers can resist a decline in real wages indefinitely. A similar argument would apply to increases in taxation and benefits.
Our estimates of the NAIRU, which on the whole seem to be in line with those of other studies, are shown in table 1. The levels of the estimated NAIRU over the full sample period and the period since 1982 are 5.9% (6.0%) and 7.5% (9.4%), where the actual unemployment rates are given in brackets. From 1988 onwards, the estimated NAIRU and the actual unemployment rates are 6.2% and 8.4%, respectively. The estimates are closely related to the actual unemployment rate. It is, however evident, that unemployment has been above its longrun level over the last fifteen years or so. (15) equation (11b) 5.2-9.9 8.5
1988 -1990 6.8 other studies (5) equation (11b) 3.5-8.1 7.1
Notes: All the information in Table 1 , except for the NAIRU estimates of equation 11b, are taken from Cromb (1993) . The entry `other studies' refers to the total number (in brackets) of other sources which report the NAIRU range referred to in the last column. Table 2 quantifies the factors that affected the changes in the NAIRU over particular subperiods. The effects of the contributory variables on the NAIRU can be explained by the changes in the average values of each variable. More concretely, the differences were calculated with the help of the formula: ∆NAIRU = θ∆x, where ∆ refers to the difference ofx between two periods,x refers to the average value of the variable under consideration and θ refers to the corresponding coefficient as estimated in (11b).The periods are determined as follows: the pre first oil price shock period (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , the pre-and oil price shock periods (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , the period of the two shocks (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , and the shock and after-shock periods . For all periods, the rise in the NAIRU is overwhelmingly attributed to the rise in long-term unemployment as the coefficients of equation (11b) already indicated. Over all periods, longterm unemployment contributed more than 3 percentage point to the increase in the NAIRU. Growth in capital stock reduced the NAIRU by 0.8 percentage points when the after-shock and shock periods are compared. The dramatic fall in militancy since 1982 reduced the NAIRU by 0.8 percentage points in comparison with the 1960s and 1970s, which were characterized by high strike frequency. These results raise two questions: why is it that the growth in capital stock contributes so little to reducing the NAIRU, and why is it that changes in the NAIRU are principally explained by long-term unemployment? We suggested earlier that it may be that long-term unemployment and capital shortage are directly related. The argument is that the consequences of capital scrapping in the two shock periods were a rapid increase in unemployment. During the recovery, capacity was constrained so that only a fraction of the displaced workers were reemployed and as the installation of additional capacity takes a considerable period of time, those workers who remained unemployed during the recovery became the stigmatized and discouraged long-term unemployed, as suggested by hysteresis models. If this was the case, it could very well be that some of the effect measured by the capital stock, was actually contributed by the long-term unemployment rate. It is thus important that we study the latter more closely.
The Cointegrating Relationship for Long-term Unemployment
Big adverse shocks like the oil price shocks, cause capital scrapping, or, at least a significant slowdown in investment. Since there is a considerable time lag between the rise in unemployment during a recession, the recovery and, eventually, the installation of additional capital, that would allow a return to previous employment levels, displaced workers that could not find employment at the beginning of the recovery. They must become long-term unemployed. In this section we estimate the effect of a shortage in capital on long-term unemployment.
The specification of long-term unemployment is related to the one in Layard et al (1991) . Accordingly, long-term unemployment is described by the level of unemployment since the greater the unemployment level is, the harder it is to get back to work and the longer the unemployment stretch. This assumption is based on the premise that job creation is insufficient to satisfy demand, or, in other words, outflow is less considerable than inflow. This seems to be the case for the UK. However, initially, the ratio of the long-term unemployed falls when unemployment rises. We also include the percentage change in the unemployment rate and the capital stock. We started with the estimation of an autoregressive distributed lag model. The lag structure was determined on the basis of F-tests. 6 The resulting relationship is:
Estimation period: 1967Q4-1994Q4 WALD(3)=293 AR(5,86)=0.6 RESET(1,90)=2.5 NORM(2)=4.0 HET(34,56)=0.9 ADF(4)=-4.2 DF=-4.3
All coefficients are correctly signed and significant. The significance of the explanatory variables was tested with the WALD test and the residuals were tested for fourth order autocorrelation (AR), heteroscedasticity (HET), autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), functional form misspecification (RESET) and normality (NORM) and none of the tests was significant at the usual 5% significance level. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests, indicate that this is a cointegrating relationship. 7 Capital stock is a significant variable with a reasonably high effect on long-term unemployment, giving some support to our hypothesis. It was also considered that increased mobility should reduce unemployment duration (Benoit-Guilbot and Gallie, 1994) . This effect was measured by a mismatch variable, which however did not turn out to be significant. We tested for the effect of real unemployment benefits on long-term unemployment and this was never significant, either. The duration of unemployment benefits could also be an important factor in the determination of long-term unemployment. However, we could not test for this due to the unavailability of time series data. But it should be noted that a relevant OECD study (1991) does not find an apparent overall correlation between the level or the duration of unemployment benefits on long-term unemployment.
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Error Correction Models Following Engle and Granger (1987) , we estimate the error correction models corresponding to the long-run relationships for nominal wage acceleration, the unemployment rate and the longterm unemployment rate.
The novelty of the short-run wage equation is that we employed the asymmetrical error correction model by Granger and Lee (1989) and Granger and Swanson (1996) , who suggest that adjustment to the long-run can be thought of as being captured by different speeds back to the attractor, which in our case is the NAIRU. The theoretical model suggests that workers are concerned about their relative position in the wage structure and resist nominal wage cuts.
Nominal wages are sticky downwards, while upward wage adjustments will be readily sought after. In order to test this hypothesis, the error correction term (ECM) of the long-run unemployment equation was split into its positive and negative deviations from the mean. With respect to the above hypothesis, we would expect that the coefficient of adjustment is significantly lower when unemployment is above its equilibrium level (positive deviation) than when it is below it (negative deviation). In order to test for the equality of the coefficients, a Wald test (WALD IQ) was used along with the ECM denoting the negative deviations (ecmu -) and the ECM with the positive deviations (ecmu + ). The estimated error correction models are reported in table 3. The error correction terms are correctly signed and significant in all three models. None of the models seem to have obvious diagnostic problems.
We begin our discussion of the empirical results of table 3 with the nominal wage acceleration as described by equation (8), remembering, however, the long-run proportionality between real wages and productivity. We find that real wage growth, real unemployment benefit growth, unemployment acceleration as well as the growth of taxes and import cost affect nominal wage acceleration. We could not find a significant effect of capital stock growth on nominal wage acceleration, suggesting that additional investment does not mitigate inflationary pressures in the short-run. The Wald statistic rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients of the ecmu + and the ecmu -with a CHI 2 (1)=0.82 and a significance level of 0.36 indicating that there is asymmetry in the adjustment process. The coefficient on ecmu + is, as expected, significantly lower than the coefficient on ecmu -. We may therefore conclude that there is downward stickiness in nominal wage adjustment when unemployment is above its long-run level.
The short-run equation that corresponds to the NAIRU in equation (11b) is only determined by its own dynamics, the error correction terms and a dummy for 1974, which captures the effects of the 3-day working week at the beginning of that year. The growth rate of the ratio of long-term unemployed moves together with unemployment growth. Increases in unemployment growth reduce long-term unemployment. Adjustments to the long-run relationship are achieved after just over a year.
Summary and conclusions
We have presented an aggregate wage model for the UK which combines wage theories that are concerned with explaining failures in the supply side of the labour market. This model is extended by incorporating demand side aspects, more precisely, the capital shortage hypothesis. The model provides us with long-and short-run wage and unemployment equations, which we proceed to estimate.
The empirical section begins by identifying two cointegrating vectors, one describing real average wages and the other the NAIRU. It also finds it necessary to investigate the possibility of a cointegrating relationship for long-run unemployment, which is estimated, before the appropriate error correction models are investigated. We find that real wages are explained by labour productivity, long-term unemployment, the unemployment rate, worker militancy and the capital stock. As there is homogeneity between real wages and labour productivity, the NAIRU is determined by long-term unemployment, worker militancy and capital stock. Tax wedge effects, import cost effects and real benefits are not found to be relevant in the long-run, but they prove to be important in the error correction models. For the long-run analysis, we decompose the impact of each explanatory variable on the NAIRU. We find that the greatest effect comes from long-term unemployment and to a minor degree from capital shortage and militancy. Since we think that capital shortage may particularly affect longterm unemployment, we test for the effect of capital shortage on long-term unemployment and find a considerable and significant effect. For the error correction model of nominal wage determination, we find significant asymmetric responses. Nominal wages adjust when actual unemployment is above the NAIRU much more slowly than when unemployment is below the NAIRU, which confirms our theoretical priors.
The policy implications of our finings are that shortages in demand may have persistent effects on employment. Although, programmes that improve the skills of displaced workers can be important, policies that aim to enhance investment may be necessary. These policies should aim at reducing long-term real interest rates, producing a high rate of return on productive investment and creating a stable financial environment to support the real sector of the economy.
